

(Except as indicated below)

14 OCT 1959

AIRCRAFT [REDACTED]

The appearance of incomplete aircraft outside the plant building at Moscow/Fili Airframe Plant No. 23, site of production of the Bison (M-4) heavy jet bomber, indicates that production of the Bison is being phased out. The appearance of a new Soviet aircraft possibly the Bounder, is anticipated at Plant No. 23 by late 1959. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Analysis of recent intelligence now in process indicates that the USSR has produced a prototype of a supersonic transport aircraft and it may now be under going flight test. The Tupolev party when in the U.S. last July stated that such an aircraft existed. More intelligence is needed, however, to firm up what few facts are known.

[REDACTED]

GUIDED MISSILES [REDACTED]

The expansion and reorganization of [REDACTED] which has occurred since [REDACTED] was here last, has enabled us to bring the research performed on Soviet missile deployment, particularly of the ICBM, IREM and SAM, up to about the same level as our work on missile production (in addition, of course, to our continuing scheduling and costing work for estimating and other purposes). We have also increased somewhat the effort devoted to guiding collectors, which continues to be one of our highest priority activities.

(Except as indicated below)

Our work on both missile production and deployment is still directed in large part toward developing evidence of where and at what rate these activities are taking place in the Soviet Bloc. At the same time, we are analyzing what specific production and deployment activities should have taken place or should be anticipated under various assumptions regarding the current status of the Soviet missile program. This research enables us to focus more sharply both our analytical and collection efforts, and provides us with a much better framework into which to fit specific evidence as it becomes available.

25X1

During recent months, we have also been examining various alternative strategies which the Soviets might consider for the next several years in terms of the implied ICBM or IRBM requirements of each alternative. We have tentatively concluded that the numbers of missiles required for a deliberate Soviet surprise attack which has a high level of assurance of preventing unacceptable damage on the USSR from Western retaliatory forces are so great that they exceed considerably any reasonable Soviet program to produce and deploy them, and that a sizable deterrent missile force represents the only realistic strategic objective for the USSR for the foreseeable future.

[REDACTED]
(Except as indicated below)

25X1 NAVAL SHIPBUILDING [REDACTED]

Soviet naval shipbuilding appears to be oriented toward two main objectives: (1) the improvement of the submarine fleet by the addition of high performance submarines including nuclear powered and missile launching submarines; and (2) improvements in the area of anti-submarine warfare.

25X1 Since 1956, seven [REDACTED] new submarine projects have been identified. [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED] Two of the projects probably are nuclear propelled and one or more may be equipped to launch guided missiles.

It is believed that a few nuclear powered submarines were completed by the end of 1958 although ORR feels that one may have been completed in early 1957.

The only known guided missile program associated with surface vessels is the Kotlin-class destroyer conversion and a probable new class of destroyers equipped with a short range surface-to-surface missile.

ASW improvements have been made in the field of new weaponry and electronics and include new vessel types.

Shipyard capacity not used for naval construction is being employed in the construction of merchant types, however, the output is very low in comparison to capacity and to 1955 naval vessel output.